Research Briefing: How "Almost Winning" on Slot Machines Evokes Unique Neural Signatures in Gamblers

My colleagues and I have just had a multi-methods imaging study on slot machine gambling published in NeuroImage. The article describes the findings of two studies, one conducted with fMRI and the other with magnetoencephalography MEG, which were part of a large project funded by the Wales Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (WICN). The NeuroImage article is the culmination of several years' hard work from everyone involved. I can't tell you how relieved I am to finally see it in print! It's certainly been one of the longest duration projects I have ever worked on, and also perhaps the most rewarding because it has taught me the value of interdisciplinary collaboration and how finding answers to the really interesting scientific questions really does require the input of a wide range of subject experts.

Background: The Near-Miss Effect

At the time we started this project, a lot was known about the neurobehavioural mechanisms of the "near-miss effect" in simulated slot machine gambling, thanks mainly to Luke Clark's lab at Cambridge and Mark Dixon's pioneering behavioural work at Southern Illinois (Mike Dixon at Calgary has since down some fantastic work in this regard). The near-miss effect refers to a cluster of findings concerning the neurobehavioural effects of "almost winning". Typically studied using simulated, multi-reel slot machines, near-misses may be defined as a losing display physically resembling a winning display (i.e., two out of three matching symbols on the payout line of three-reel slot). Now, you need three matching symbols to win on a given spin, but 2/3 is deemed closer to a win than, say, a 1/3 display. They are both losses, but the near-miss is subjective and objectively deemed to be almost a win, perhaps due to physical resemblance/generalization.

 

We know that the proportion of near-misses influences gambling persistence (around a third of trials presenting near-misses is generally thought best), that people (gamblers and non-gamblers alike) rate their chances of winning on the next spin higher than  following losses, that spins following near-misses are usually initiated faster than after other outcomes, and that physiological arousal to near-misses resembles that of actual wins. Studies by Luke Clark, Mark Dixon and colleagues have individually shown that near-misses evoke activation in ventral striatum, rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), and in reward-related neurocircuitry, such as the midbrain (substantia nigra/ventral tegmental). Even the extent of activation is predicted by gambling severity: indeed, the more severe your gambling problem or history is, the greater the activiation seen in anterior insula (bilaterally) in non-gamblers (Clark et al., 2009) and in the midbrain of gamblers (Chase & Clark, 2010).

Of course, there's only so much that fMRI research, with its reliance on the slow haemodynamic BOLD response, can tell us about the brain systems underlying gambling behaviour (I will gladly leave it to others with far better expertise than me to fully explain the issues involved - here and in terms of fMRI vs. MEG, here). Instead, we wished to examine the temporal dynamics and oscillatory changes involved in the near-miss effect and hence chose magnetoencephalography (MEG) as the method to do so.

Our Methods and Predictions

We first measured BOLD-fMRI in a mixed sample of gamblers and non-gamblers and focused on the overlap between activation related to wins and near-misses, and examined the associations with gambling severity and a trait measure of cognitive distortions. We predicted that similar activation patterns would be seen when near-misses were contrasted with losses and when wins were contrasrted with losses. Also, we expected that activitation of the insula to near-misses would be predicted by gambling cognitions.

We designed a simulated, three-reel slot machine task based on Mark Dixon's previous fMRI work. Here's an illustration:

Participants spun the reels, viewed the outcomes and made ratings while lying in the MRI scanner or sitting in the MEG device. We compared separate groups of gamblers and non-gamblers using MEG to investigate induced oscillatory power changes associated with win and near-miss, relative to loss, outcomes. Our focus was on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)/ACC and insula regions previously identified in fMRI studies.

By using MEG, we were also able to record EEG at different frequency ranges as well. So, on the basis of previous EEG/ERP work, we were particularly interested in whether near-misses would induce greater theta power, in the 4-7Hz range, in gamblers compared to non-gamblers in our frontal and insula regions of interest.

All participants were administered the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and, in the MEG study, their scores determined which group they were assigned to (gamblers or non-gamblers).

Our Findings

Generally, near-misses recruited similar brain regions to wins, including right inferior frontal gyrus and insula. Behaviourally, both gamblers and non-gamblers rated near-misses as closer to a win than a loss (replicating this intriguing effect once again):

BOLD-fMRI responses in the insula to near-misses were associated with the extent to which participants thought about gambling (GRCS) - this neatly replicates an earlier finding from Luke Clark's lab.

Increased theta-band oscillations to near-misses were observed in the insula and right OFC, which were positively associated with gambling severity. The MEG data for R OFC and cognitive distortions related to gambling are shown below:

Taken together, these data show that the near-miss effect in slot machine gambling is underpinned by increases in theta power in R OFC and insula, and which gamblers are particularly sensitive to, and that such increases are associated with the extent to which someone reports cognitive distortions related to gambling and with gambling history/severity. The hope is that the diagnostic and therapeutic implications of these findings might one day be realised by, for instance, devising interventions to attenuate the neural signatures of this near-miss effect.

Reference:

Dymond, S., Lawrence, N.S., Dunkley, B., Yuen, S.L.K., Hinton, E.C., Dixon, M.R., Hoon, A.E., Munnelly, A., Muthukumaraswamy, S.D., & Singh, K.S. (2014). Almost winning: Induced MEG theta power in insula and orbitofrontal cortex increases during gambling near-misses and is associated with BOLD signal and gambling severity. NeuroImage, 91, 210-219. PDF

Some links to media coverage of our research

Swansea University press release
Press-News.org (Poland)
Daily Kos (US)
AllVoices
Science Codex
M2
Electronics Weekly
Medical Xpress  
The Exeter Daily
domain-b.com 
Medical Boox
UPI
Breitbart
Gaming Zion
Business Standard
AniNews
WebIndia123
Science Daily
National Geographic  
The Economist

Keep Calm: Here's Today's Misrepresentation of Radical Behaviourism (and What You Can Do To Protect Yourself From It)

In what someone, somewhere clearly thought would be a good way of filling time during the quiet news month of January, many influential writers and thinkers were asked, "what scientific idea is due for retirement in 2014"?

Among the 174 responses, which include a range of topics such as quantum physics, statistics, and evolutionary biology, is a contribution from leading autism expert, Professor Simon Baron-Cohen. Prof. Baron-Cohen thinks that "Radical Behaviourism" should be retired in 2014. He claims that radical behaviourism:

• "was displaced by the cognitive revolution, because it was deeply flawed scientifically".
• that Chomsky's (1959) now infamous review of B.F. Skinner's (1957) book, Verbal Behavior, essentially killed-off an entire field of study before it had even begun.
• that "there is more to behavior than just learned associations. There are evolved neurocognitive mechanisms".
• that radical behaviourism is "scientifically uninformative".
• and that it should cease to be implemented via "'behavior modification' programs, in which a trainer aims to shape another person's or an animal's behaviour". 
• Baron-Cohen then mentions a researcher who conducts research at "the interface of neuroscience and ethics" who examined the life of a captured orca, or killer whale, "involved" in the deaths of three people, which "may have been a reaction to the Radical Behaviorists who were training this orca to show new behaviors".

There is so much wrong with this argument that it is hard to know where to start. Professor Richard Hastings has delivered an excellent riposte to Baron-Cohen's "retirement anti-eulogy" by describing a dystopian vision of what the world might actually look like without radical behaviourism. In fact, the influence of behavioural thinking is far deeper ingrained in our scientific and cultural lives than Baron-Cohen might think. Lee Hulbert-Williams has also just responded.

Here, I wish to briefly address the stated reasons for why Baron-Cohen thinks radical behaviourism should be wiped from the annals of scientific history. In so doing, I will revisit many of the same issues and mistakes made by undergraduates as they grapple with the history of psychology and with behaviorism's place within it.

Point 1. Do Amoeba Dream of Blackfish?

First, it's unclear whether Baron-Cohen is aware of the difference between J.B. Watson's methodological behaviourism and B.F. Skinner's radical behaviourism. The latter, radical behaviourism, was so named because Skinner was determined to emphasise the differences between his account and Watson's. These differences included the consideration of "private events" or thoughts, feeling and attitudes, etc. in a science of behaviour.

Now, that's radical compared to Watson's behaviorism in which all unobservable events were excluded from scientific analysis. Watson emphasised overt, observable dimensions of behaviour as his sole subject matter. He wasn't concerned with what may be going on "under the hood".

So, thinking and feeling do play a role in modern radical behaviorism (and are far more complex than simple stimulus-response associations); it's just that such events are not given causal status in behavioural analysis. It's a complex, philosophical argument to fully describe but private events are basically deemed "behaviour" (as a mass noun, not a count noun) and all such behaviour is the product of environmental events working in tandem with evolutionary (phylogenic) and individual (ontogenic) variables. Change the environment and behaviour changes (including thoughts).

Point 2: We're Not Talking About A Revolution!

Talking in terms of a "cognitive revolution" is now old hat and a woeful over-simplification of how the self-corrective processes of science actually work. As Henry Roediger has written ("What Happened to Behaviorism?"), it is a "cartoon view of the history of psychology" and behaviourism has today "won the intellectual debate". 

Point 3: Dear Reader, Please Don't Believe the Hype.

When someone critiques a field of enquiry outside of their own and in ways that illustrate they have little or no expertise in what they are commenting on (I am unclear as to Baron-Cohen's training in behaviourism and his ability to keep up with modern developments in the literature), then Chomsky is usually never far behind. Wow, never has a single book review been said to exert so much power, and for so long! That's because it's not credible.

But, if we were to believe the hype, then Chomsky not only trashed Skinner's functional account of language but also torpedoed a research agenda of an entire discipline before it even had a chance to gain momentum. This is inaccurate on several levels.

Skinner's account, while limited, has been cited countless times and forms the basis of numerous effective and well-validated intervention strategies designed to get people with developmental disorders, brain injury, and other conditions to speak (or once lost, to regain the ability to speak). For sure, it may not have had quite the impact outside of behaviour analysis that many would have liked, particularly in the domain of complex human language and cognition, but if Baron-Cohen had kept up with his reading over the past few decades he would have encountered more than a fair share of exciting modern developments in this domain. Relational frame theory (RFT), for instance, is a post-Skinnerian behavioural account of language and cognition that has generated lots of research and aims to move beyond some of the limitations of Skinner's conceptual account, which is, let's face it is more than 50 years old!

Point 4. Is this the Psych 101 Class?

No one doubts the role of evolved abilities and neurocognitive systems in language, certainly not in behaviourism. Most behaviourists agree with Baron-Cohen that "there is more to behavior than just learned associations". Indeed, discriminative stimuli, conditional stimuli, contextual cues, motivating operations, reinforcement history, and other current and situational demands all exert an influence over behaviour.

But anyone with even a passing knowledge of behaviour principles would know that. Sometimes, all of the answers to life's questions can't be answered on the basis of a Psych 101 class.

 Point 5. The Road to Nowhere.

How does one evaluate the claim that radical behaviourism is "scientifically uninformative"? With a Talking Heads video, of course!

Radical behaviourism, the philosophy of the science of behavior, is elegant, practical and parsimonious. It rejects hypothetical constructs and mediational variables. They simply impede progress towards the stated goals of science: prediction and influence (with precision, scope and depth). It rejects the hypothetico-deductive model, emphasises inductive research methods (including single case or small-n designs), acknowledges a clear role for theory, particularly what is known as analytic-abstractive theory, in science and forms the basis of modern, functional contextual approaches to human psychology. Uninformative? I think not.

Point 6: Has Anyone Seen Blackfish?

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Baron-Cohen's misinformed tract against radical behaviourism, is his failure to acknowledge the empirical support for treatments based on radical behaviourism, such as applied behaviour analysis for autism spectrum disorders. Instead, Baron-Cohen concludes his piece with an anecdote about animal training, such as that undertaken with killer whales at places like Seaworld in the USA (and the subject of a compelling recent documentary called Blackfish).

If we focus on animal training for a moment, behavioural principles have been used to train rats to detect landmines and tuberculosis (TB), honey bees to detect explosives, dolphins and other marine mammals in naval operations, and in training "seeing-eye" or guide dogs (without having to worry about "who or what the animal really is"). There are numerous other examples.

Putting animal training aside, Baron-Cohen must be aware of the effectiveness of applied behaviour analysis for autism. After all, he chaired the committee responsible for drawing up the NICE clinical guidelines on autism in adults. Quoting from the guidelines (thanks to Richie May for this), we find:

"1.5.3 When deciding on the nature and content of a psychosocial intervention to address challenging behaviour, use a functional analysis. The functional analysis should facilitate the targeting of interventions that address the function(s) of problem behaviour(s) by:

• providing information, from a range of environments, on:
• factors that appear to trigger the behaviour
• the consequences of the behaviour (that is, the reinforcement received as a result of their behaviour[14])
• identifying trends in behaviour occurrence, factors that may be evoking that behaviour, and the needs that the person is attempting to meet by performing the behaviour."

Now, that sounds very behavioural to me.

Perhaps Baron-Cohen prefers to think of radical behaviourism as being synonymous with 'behavior modification', in which the underlying causes of the behaviour in question were often overlooked at the expense of conducting a reductive intervention, and not with 'applied behaviour analysis', where the function of behaviour is matched to (individualised) treatment, then so be it.

I hope I have shown that this is an historically inaccurate stance which only serves to reinforce the impression that he is a little too far removed from what he is critiquing.

Coming next: my take on quantum mechanics! 


**Update: 24/1/14: More reaction and comment here -  Hank Schlinger and Bob Remington give Baron-Cohen a C+ and Simon Baron-Cohen’s Fantastically False Article on Radical Behavior: An Example of Valid, but False Premises***

Research briefing - Relational Memory Generalization and Integration: The Role of Task Awareness

Anita Munnelly, a former PhD student, and I have just had a paper published in Neurobiology of Learning & Memory about which we are very excited and want to share!

The paper describes the results of two experiments from Anita's PhD thesis investigating the effects of prior instructed task awareness, and a couple of other methodological factors, on humans' transitive inference (TI) ability, which is considered a hallmark of human and nonhuman reasoning.

In a typical TI task, overlapping pairs of simultaneous discriminations are trained, such as A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, and D+E- (where “+” indicates reinforced choices and “–” non-reinforced choices), before novel combinations of stimulus pairs (e.g., AE, BD) are presented in a test phase in the absence of feedback. Now, the AE endpoint test pair may be solved without reference to the intervening pairs, and A chosen over E, since during training A is always reinforced and E is never reinforced. On the other hand, the BD non-endpoint pair have comparable training histories since reinforcement is made available equally often for choices of B and D during training. Despite this, selection of B over D is predicted because D was paired with E during training, which was never reinforced. We used Kanji script stimuli, as shown in the figure below:

Anita and I were interested in the role of instructed awareness in facilitating TI, so we explicitly informed one group of participants that they should pay close attention during training as the stimulus pairs reflected an underlying hierarchy (i.e, A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, and D+E-), while another group were not given this instruction. We also employed repeated training and testing exposures, so if someone didn't meet criterion at test, he or she was re-exposed to the training and testing sequence a maximum of two more times. This allows for consistent correct (predicted) and incorrect (unpredicted) performances to emerge; it's also an approached based on functional-accounts of relational memory which emphasise that a prior relational learning history may be both necessary and sufficient for novel behaviour, such as that seen on tests for TI, to emerge. Another factor we manipulated was presenting the critical BD probe trials at an early stage of learning to chart the time-course of emergence of this relational ability.


Results demonstrated that prior instructional task awareness led to a minor, but non-significant, performance advantage (in Experiment 1, 80% of the Instructed group, and 63% of the Uninstructed group, met criterion at test. Similarly, in Experiment 2, 86% of the Instructed group and 69% of the Uninstructed group met test criterion). Informing participants about the underlying stimulus hierarchy, combined with repeated training and testing (as necessary), did not lead to better TI performance. Moreover, presenting BD trials throughout Experiment 2 did not faciliate performance, and behavioural accuracy was not correlated with a post-experimental measure of task awareness.


So, a mixed bag. Instructing participants that the stimuli formed an underlying hierarchy didn't boost test performance, although any instructional effects may have been mitigated by the predetermined exposure and mastery criteria we employed. Also, the present findings were obtained with a relatively small sample size; further research with larger samples sizes is therefore necessary to replicate the findings and determine the size of any possible effects.


Here's the references and a link to the PDF:

Munnelly, A., & Dymond, S. (2014). Relational memory generalization and integration in a transitive inference task with and without instructed awareness. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 109, 169-177.

Yet Another End/Start of Year List: Some of My Favourite Records of 2013

Depeche Mode - Delta Machine

DJ Koze - Amygdala

Kid Cudi - Indicud

Daniel Avery - Drone Logic

Trentemoller - Lost

James Blake - Overgrown

Mano Le Tough - Changing Days 

Jon Hopkins - Immunity


Bonobo -Northern Borders

Foals - Holy Fire

Blood Orange - Cupid Deluxe

Onehotrix Point Never - R Plus Seven

Kaito- Until The End of Time

Sebastian Tellier - Confection

The National - Trouble Will Find Me

Tim Hecker - Virgins

Darkside - Psychic

Burial - Rival Dealer EP

Blue Hawaii - Untogether

The Field - Cupid's Head

Mazzy Star - Seasons of Your Day

FKA Twigs - EP2

Forest Swords - Engravings

Machinedrum - Vapor City

Apparat -  Krieg und Frieden (Music For Theatre)

Cliff Martinez - Only God Forgives OST

Mixes, Compilations & Podcasts

Danny Howells - Balance 24

John Talabot - DJ Kicks

Bonobo - Late Night Tales

Apollonia - Fabric 70

Adam Freeland -Kazantip 118 BPM @ 5AM

DJ Koze - XLR8R podcast

Dave DK - Datatransmission podcast

Anton Zap - Resident Advisor podcast

Merveille & Crosson - Resident Advisor podcast

Santa Kos Xmas-Goodie